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Executive Summary 
  
 Officers from the Lexington Division of Police have begun planning the implementation 
of a popular United Kingdom crime prevention program, Secured by Design, in Lexington, 
Kentucky.  Many municipalities in the United States operate crime prevention by design 
programs, focusing on how the built environment affects criminal behavior.  Secured by Design, 
a specific crime prevention by design program privately owned by the U.K.'s Association of 
Chief Police Officers, partners with U.K. police and urban planning departments to encourage 
adoption of building and design practices believed to prevent crime.  Lexington would be the 
first U.S. city to have a Secured by Design program.   
 The objective of this analysis was to review existing literature on crime prevention by 
design programs to identify best practices and barriers to effective program implementation, 
adapt Secured by Design program requirements to equivalent LFUCG divisions and Fayette 
County-area housing developers and to interview relevant Lexington program implementers to 
compare initial preferences on the program structure and approach against best practices 
identified in existing literature.  Among interviewed representatives from the Division of Police, 
Division of Planning, Lexington-Fayette Urban County Council and the Home Builders 
Association of Lexington, a preferred approach to implementing Secured by Design was evident; 
Secured by Design will be a voluntary program led by Lexington Police.  Apart from agreement 
on the general structure, plans for implementation did not always match practices used in other 
municipalities or factors identified by researchers as important for program success.  
Furthermore, duplicating the effect of the U.K.'s Secured by Design program in Lexington may 
depend largely on political and contextual factors that do not exist in the U.S.        
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Project Background 
            Secured by Design is an English crime prevention certification program that brings 
police, architects, urban planners, product manufacturers and housing developers together to 
“design out” burglaries and other criminal activity prior to new housing construction.  As 
explained by one Lexington police officer, "Secured by Design considers the relationship 
between crime and design at the level of a single window and an entire neighborhood."  
Physically securing entrance points through locks and quality construction materials, fostering 
clear lines of sight through lighting and the placement of windows, managing neighborhood foot 
traffic by strategically placing walking paths and other design techniques have been found to 
discourage criminal behavior (Cozens 2005).  A Secured by Design program is currently being 
developed for Lexington, Kentucky in conjunction with the Lexington Division of Police and the 
Eastern Kentucky University Center for Crime and the Built Environment.   
 In March 2009, Lexington police representatives traveled to the United Kingdom to learn 
about how the 20 year-old program might work in Fayette County (Eblen 2010).  As part of 
Lexington's November 2009 Sustainable Communities Conference, community leaders and area 
academics hosted a roundtable discussion of environmental sustainability through architecture, 
urban planning and crime prevention (UK COD 2009).  Included at the conference was a 
presentation by Calvin Beckford of the United Kingdom's Association of Chief Police Officers 
entitled "Crime Prevention and Sustainability: The English Experience."   
 Members of the Lexington Home Builders Association are involved in development of 
the program.  Two of the association's largest housing developers, Ball Homes and Anderson 
Communities, attended Secured by Design training seminars in Maryland provided by the 
National House Building Council, a United Kingdom warranty and insurance provider for new 
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homes (Johnson 2010).  The Lexington Home Builders Association presently has sent doors, 
locks and other building materials to be tested for Secured by Design compliance.      
            Does Lexington, Kentucky have a uniquely high crime rate that caused officials to seek 
out information on Secured by Design?  No.  Lexington’s total Part 1 crimes (homicide, rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) were 14,074 in 
1980, 16,354 in 1990, and 11,914 in 2009 (Lexington Division of Police 2010).  But like other 
municipalities around the world, Lexington's available resources to combat crime through police, 
courts and corrections are increasingly strained by an economic recession (Mead 2010).  For 
LFUCG leaders, programs with the potential to proactively reduce crime in Lexington are 
appealing, but deciding how to implement a Secured by Design program depends upon the initial 
and long-term operational costs the City can expect to incur and on the types of logistical barriers 
such a program would have to overcome to operate effectively in Fayette County. 
 
Research overview 
Objectives of this analysis include: 
1.    Review components of the Secured by Design program and existing literature on 
crime prevention by design to identify best practices and barriers to effective program 
implementation by:  
o Defining components of crime prevention through design programs by compiling 
a history of academic theories and later adaptations by police or program 
practitioners; 
o Identifying implementation methods employed by municipalities to mitigate 
crime through design techniques; and by 
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o Analyzing evidence or examples of certain program implementation approaches 
and interpretations of the six Secured by Design theoretical components.     
2.    Adapt Secured by Design program components to equivalent LFUCG divisions and 
Fayette County-area housing developers to reveal: 
o Possible LFUCG cost implications for different Secured by Design program 
implementation approaches;   
o Possible costs for housing developers for different Secured by Design program 
implementation approaches; and to identify   
o How different program approaches might interact with political, organizational or 
logistical factors in Fayette County. 
3.   Identify and interview relevant Lexington program implementers including two 
representatives from the Division of Police, two representatives from the Division of 
Planning, one representative from the Urban County Council and one representative from 
the Home Builders Association of Lexington to:  
o Measure perceptions about beginning a Secured by Design program in Fayette 
County; 
o Estimate organizational capacities to comply with different types of crime 
prevention by design programs; and to 
o Develop a comparison between best practices identified in existing literature and 
what interviewees identified as preferred program components and 
implementation approaches. 
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History, Program Principles 
            Either consciously or otherwise, behavioral decisions may be influenced by the 
surrounding environment (Stark 1987).  Beginning in the 1970s, criminologists and researchers 
began to hypothesize that certain types of crimes - burglary, home invasion, robbery, trespassing, 
loitering, property damage and other illegal activities - could be discouraged in a given area by 
changing structural and landscaping features of the surrounding environment (Cozens 2005).  C. 
Ray Jeffrey's Crime Prevention through Environmental Design and Oscar Newman's Creating 
Defensible Space formalized crime prevention theories, concluding that apartment complexes, 
schools, parks, businesses and neighborhoods could discourage criminal behavior by increasing 
natural surveillance and distinguishing public areas from private areas.  Potential criminals, they 
argued, calculate the opportunity of apprehension before committing a crime (Newman 1973 and 
Jeffrey 1977).  The landscaping and architectural layout of a building can be designed to 
maximize visibility by residents of the premises.  If intruders feel someone else is watching, their 
behavior may be affected.  Shrubbery, pavement designs, fences, streets and sidewalks can be 
designed to delineate who is and is not authorized to be in a given area.  When a sense of 
territoriality or ownership of a space is well-conveyed to all, potential offenders perceive what 
sort of behavior is not welcomed (Beckford 2008).  
            By the 1980s, case studies emerged evaluating the impact of Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED), Defensible Space and similar crime prevention by design 
programs in public housing developments, commercial areas and other high-crime urban 
settings.  Empirical evaluations of crime prevention by design programs proved problematic for 
researchers (Cozens 2005).  The difficulty of separating crime prevention by design's role from 
other factors that may influence crime patterns hindered efforts to investigate program outcomes 
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and similarly limited the opportunity for lawmakers or public administrators to evaluate the 
value of implementing such a program.  
            As environmental design usage by police departments and municipal governments grew, 
so too did the list of components deemed important for the program's success.  Jeffrey and 
Newman's original Defensible Space and Safety by Design theories evolved to encompass six 
interrelated concepts: Ownership, Surveillance, Access Control and Movement, Property 
Management and Maintenance, Activity Support and Target Hardening (ODPM 2004, Moffatt 
1983).  Table 1 summarizes core components of each concept.  What tactics should and should  
not be formally included in crime 
prevention by design programs is 
not universally agreed upon by 
researchers or practitioners.  Some 
definitions consider community 
policing, neighborhood  
watch and other tactics to be 
components of crime prevention by 
design programs.  Target 
Hardening, for instance, is perhaps 
universally understood by property 
owners and police as an effective 
crime deterrent, independent of any 
crime prevention by design program.  The core concepts featured in Table 1 for Secured by 
Design are fundamentally identical to the principles of CPTED or Defensible Space.   
Table 1 
Secured by Design: Basic Concepts 
Ownership  Pathway designs, railings, landscaping, signage or other 
means of signaling territorial claim of a space (e.g. public 
sidewalk from private porch)  
Surveillance Natural surveillance by neighbors having a window view 
and/or street traffic having a line of sight to property 
entrances and public spaces; mechanical surveillance 
through adequate lighting and video cameras   
Access Control 
and Movement 
Footpaths, physical barriers, building design and property 
layout can limit entrance points to vehicle or pedestrian 
traffic 
Property 
Management 
and 
Maintenance 
A property's physical appearance - cleanliness, 
landscaping and ongoing upkeep may discourage criminal 
activity 
Activity Support Buildings can be designed to encourage non-criminal 
activities (walking, fellowship) to occur in or near public 
spaces; Activity Support integrates actual resident use of 
spaces to increase Surveillance, Ownership and Access 
Control and Movement   
Target 
Hardening 
Open, unlocked or poorly maintained windows, doors and 
other entry points increase targeting of a property by 
criminals  
(ODPM 2004, Moffat 1983, Cozens 2002 and Robinson 1999)  
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Evaluation Challenges 
            Even if program principles like Surveillance and Ownership "made sense" to police and 
urban architects, evaluations of CPTED effectiveness in different locations and environments 
produced either mixed or inconclusive results (Cozens 2005, Poyner 1983, Booth 1981).  A 1981 
comparison of households where CPTED had been in place found it effective at deterring crimes 
in indoor public areas, but not in outdoor spaces.  Ronald Clarke discussed the validity issues 
inherent in measuring situational crime prevention in his 1995 British Journal of Criminology 
article, stating that among the large number of crime prevention by design programs deemed to 
be a success, "it has to be recognized that in most cases the individual evaluations were 
comparatively rudimentary," (Clarke 1995).  Most evaluations, Clarke suggested, were simple 
time-series or quasi-experimental designs that included only minimal follow-up reviews, creating 
the situation where "it was impossible to be sure that the identified situational measure had 
produced the observed reduction in crime." 
             Methodological challenges identified by Clarke, Cozens and other crime prevention by 
design evaluators, mirror problems in the wider body of crime prevention literature (Dershem 
1990).  Crime prevention programs continue to be supported by police, criminal justice 
professors and the general public despite conclusive evidence that such programs actually reduce 
crime.  Evidence of the efficacy of specific crime prevention by design components (e.g. the use 
of dead-bolt locks) is more accepted that reviews of total crime prevention programs like 
community policing or crime prevention by design (Dershem 1990, O'Shea 2000, Cozens 2005).  
A 2000 study of home security measures found that homeowners whose entrances were not 
visibly obscured by landscaping, or those who employed window locks and solid wood or steel 
 10 
exterior doors reduced their chance of burglary (O'Shea 2000).  Similar studies abound (Cozens 
2005).  By including in crime prevention by design programs things that police and homeowners 
might consider commonsensical, such programs are predisposed to be effective.  
            Difficulties identifying program effectiveness have implications for Lexington.  Specific 
evaluations of the Secured by Design program are few, the most prominent of which is a 2000 
study conducted by Rachel Armitage of the University of Huddersfield for the U.K. Home Office 
(Beckford 2008, Armitage 2000).  Armitage attempted to select two neighborhoods whose only 
relevant difference was Secured by Design certification and compare crime changes for the same 
two periods.  Burglary rates were found to be twice as high in non-Secured by Design homes 
than in homes certified by the program (Armitage 2000).  But even if a larger body of Secured 
by Design research existed that further validated the program's effect, program implementers in 
Lexington would still have to cautiously appraise their chance for duplicating the U.K.'s apparent 
successes.  Evaluation limitations seen in other Secured by Design and crime prevention by 
design programs in general will also characterize Lexington's program.  Even if the program 
does prevent crime, it will difficult to demonstrate Secured by Design's specific influence.  
Identifying actual program outcomes will be difficult, as will be justifying to city leaders that the 
program warrants expansion or funding support.   
 
Emergence of Secured by Design 
            Widespread adoption of crime prevention by design concepts first occurred in 1980s 
England, but such programs have become increasingly common in the United States since the 
1990s.  CPTED or Defensible Space programs have been implemented to varying degrees by 
municipalities, school districts, neighborhood associations and police departments ranging from 
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Fargo, North Dakota; Tampa, Florida; Oakland, California to Louisville, Kentucky (Feins 1997 
and NICP 2009).  Interest in designing out crime from the community may be explained to some 
extent by factors beyond a desire to increase safety.  The U.S. judicial system increasingly holds 
landlords accountable for not preventing crime under premise liability law (Gordon and Brill 
1996).  As judge or jury awards to residential tenants, convenience store patrons or pedestrians 
who are victims of a crime increase, the willingness of property owners to implement and 
maintain crime prevention by design standards or other crime prevention strategies may increase.  
            In 1989, the United Kingdom's Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) established 
Secured by Design as a collection of police initiatives that promote quality design techniques for 
homes, businesses and other physical locations.  One of Secured by Design's primary initiatives 
is a testing and certification program (ACPO 2010).  The ACPO approves products like doors, 
locks, windows, roofing, and storage devices in addition to providing certifications for architects, 
developers and home security installers.  In January 2007, for instance, Decra Roof Systems 
became the first manufacturer of roofing tiles to receive Secured by Design accreditation (Decra 
2010).  Criminals have gained access into buildings containing expensive equipment or 
pharmaceuticals by removing roof tiles and breaking in through the ceiling.  Decra's tiles and 
roof installation products were tested for resistance to tampering and removal with pry-bars and 
other tools.  More than 350 product manufacturers to date have been granted usage of the 
Secured by Design logo after submitting products for testing, being approved and agreeing to 
pay an annual membership fee based on the size of the company and the number of certified 
products (ACPO 2010).  Developers can request inspection of a newly-constructed building and 
receive Secured by Design designation at no cost.  As a not-for-profit company, Secured by 
Design is funded by licensing fees and grants from the UK Government.  Police departments of 
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local governments bear the costs of hiring 'Crime Prevention Design Advisers' who conduct 
property inspections and offer advice on designing out crime.      
            Variations of crime prevention by design are common in the U.S., but Lexington would 
be the first to implement a Secured by Design program (Jones 2010).  While some components 
of the U.K.'s Secured by Design program are distinct from other crime prevention initiatives in 
the U.S. (e.g. the certification of building materials), their shared principles make an examination 
of implementation approaches by U.S. local governments applicable.  Understanding how the 
concept of Surveillance or Ownership should be formally interpreted by a new Secured by 
Design program in Lexington necessitates a review of the approaches taken in other U.S. local 
governments' crime prevention by design programs.  Given that the Secured by Design program 
is supported by a structure unique to the United Kingdom, Lexington will still have to adapt its 
program to the current bureaucratic structures and policies in Lexington and the United States.    
             
Implementation Approaches 
            Resource allocations by municipalities for administering a safety by design program vary, 
as do the specific approaches taken for achieving program compliance in the community.  Table 
2 summarizes implementation approaches and specific Secured by Design components.  Some 
city governments formally support crime prevention by design usage, but offer voluntary 
compliance on the part of developers.  Others may require consultation on all new property 
developments with a crime prevention by design-trained administrator.  Program components 
like Activity Support are interpreted differently by particular cities and by academic researchers 
or program practitioners (Sorensen 2003 and Cozens 2002).  Early secured by design programs 
administered by police departments in the United Kingdom emphasized minimizing foot traffic 
Table 2 
Implementation Approaches and Interpretations of Program Principles    
Practice Supporting arguments Opposing arguments Determining contextual factors   Evidence or Examples 
Implementation Approaches 
Crime prevention by design 
included as a goal of long-term 
city vision statements or 
comprehensive plans, usually as 
part of planning, zoning or 
public safety policy 
Allows crime prevention by design to be 
adopted over a long period of time 
without requiring immediate funds or 
specific policies  
By using language like "encourage" or 
"incorporate crime prevention by design as 
feasible," such plans decrease the likelihood of 
immediate program adoption and possible crime 
prevention 
If matched with an action plan that breaks down 
long term goals into actionable steps, cities may 
eventually develop a working crime prevention by 
design program; Vision statement must have 
support of city officials, property owners and 
developers  
City of Roanoke, Virginia's Vision 
2001-2020 listed "[r]evise zoning 
ordinance to integrate crime prevention 
by design in development review 
process"  (Roanoke 2010) 
Consultation with crime 
prevention by design 
administrator required for all 
new properties except single-
family homes; Compliance with 
consultation voluntary 
Eases resistance to program 
implementation by gradually raising 
awareness of crime prevention by design 
practices; Program administrator can 
develop expertise over best local 
implementation strategies  
Costs required for administration of a program 
that does not require compliance; Does not 
include single-family homes or existing property 
If existing city planning or public works staff can 
be utilized to enforce crime prevention by design, 
the costs of this voluntary compliance approach 
might be more justifiable; If efforts are not 
supported by area developers a consultation 
program is a less controversial alternative 
In 1996, Broward County, Florida 
required site and building designs to be 
reviewed by Director of Development 
Management for crime prevention by 
design compliance (Broward 2010)  
Crime prevention by design 
standards incorporated into city 
building codes and ordinances 
for all new property 
construction or renovation 
except single-family homes  
Allows crime prevention by design to 
begin having an immediate effect; 
Specific standards help developers 
achieve program compliance  
Newly adopted crime prevention by design 
standards might be resisted by property owners; 
Difficulty reaching agreement on specific 
standards; Standards fixed by ordinance may not 
be adaptable to individual properties; Does not 
include single-family homes or existing property 
The ability to appease resistant developers and 
reach consensus on details of crime prevention by 
design standards; If crime is most prevalent in 
single-family homes or existing properties, the 
program is ineffective in the near-term 
City of SeaTac, Washington adopted a 
crime prevention by design ordinance in 
2003 that set specific standards for 
parking lots, street lighting, gas stations 
and public areas (SeaTac 2010). 
Providing grants or incentives 
for property owners to 
incorporate crime prevention by 
design in new and existing 
properties  
By subsidizing crime prevention by 
design implementation, initial adoption 
or compliance is less likely to be 
opposed by property owners 
Added program expense to city; Grants may not 
be sustainable over time; Property owners in 
pervasive crime areas may be less likely to 
utilize than developers in lower crime areas 
If grants can be made a long-term, rather than 
initial program component they facilitate crime 
prevention by design compliance; Overall program 
budget determines availability; Expertise of 
administrator determines effectiveness by awarding 
grants in most needed areas 
Property owners ability to implement 
crime prevention by design depends on 
their available financial resources 
(Parnaby 2007) 
Crime prevention by design 
principles utilized on project-
specific instance  
Facilitates a gradual introduction of 
crime prevention by design into 
community; Fewer resources needed to 
maintain program; Crime-heavy areas 
may qualify for federal or state funding 
Does not address community-wide crime 
prevention; Limits opportunities to incorporate 
Secured by Design to only when federal funding 
is available or when a property developer is 
interested  
Availability of funding or willingness of property 
developers; Changing city administrations may not 
consistently seek external funding for specific 
projects 
Though it lacks an ongoing crime 
prevention by design program, 
Louisville-Jefferson County Kentucky 
Metro Government received a grant for 
a crime prevention by design 
neighborhood assessment and 
improvement initiative in 2005 
(ACTIVE 2010) 
Require a "crime impact 
statement" for new property 
construction  
Forces developers to consider 
environmental design effect on crime 
prior to development; Allows crime 
prevention by design administrator to 
accumulate data over time to improve 
local best practices 
Requires all property developers to be trained in 
crime prevention by design principles; Does not 
address existing properties; Could add costs for 
developers to consult with attorney for premise 
liability considerations  
Program would have to consider whether such 
documents could be used in court against developer 
in premise liability litigation; How impact 
statements are used to achieve crime prevention by 
design compliance determines effectiveness  
Crime impact statements could have the 
same positive behavioral-influencing 
effect that environmental impact 
statements are believed to have (Olasky 
2004)  
Source: Author’s review of example cities or academic research. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Program Principles 
Principle Supporting arguments Opposing arguments Determining contextual factors   Evidence or Examples 
Ownership  Other crime prevention by design 
components directly or indirectly support 
Ownership; Pathway designs, railings, 
landscaping, signage or other means of 
signaling the ownership of spaces define 
acceptable behavior in an area; Possible to 
instill territoriality on existing properties 
Difficult to formally define Ownership and adapt 
concept to specific property; May require funds by 
property owner to implement successfully; May 
create an aesthetically unpleasing "fortress" look 
Ownership must be achievable without large 
investment by property owner or in an unappealing 
style; Requires competent crime prevention by design 
administrator with local expertise and crime prevention 
by design standards adaptable to the local environment 
Enhancing Ownership is effective at 
reducing actual crime and fear of crime 
Ratcliffe (2003); Cultural norms pertaining 
to Ownership are not uniform, crime 
prevention by design must be adjusted for 
individuals or neighborhoods (Merry 1981) 
Surveillance By eliminating design or landscaping 
barriers to provide a clear line of sight 
around a property, residents or passers-by 
can monitor activity; Surveillance indicates 
to potential criminals that illegitimate 
behavior will be seen and reported to 
police; Video cameras may assist police in 
criminal apprehension 
Existing properties may be expensive to retrofit for 
proper surveillance; Even when a property is 
designed to allow for surveillance, crime may occur 
when residents are not watching at night; Residents 
may be unwilling to report crime for fear of 
retribution; Cameras may intrude on privacy of 
property users or residents 
Surveillance opportunities facilitated by design require 
active cooperation by residents; Surveillance may be 
most effective if in conjunction with neighborhood 
watch or community police patrolling; Properties with 
diverse residents (age, work schedule) may be more 
capable of day and night surveillance 
Burglars avoid targeting areas where the 
perception of being observed is high 
(Sorensen 2003 and Weisel 2002); Video 
cameras may be unaffordable and give a 
negative "Orwellian" feeling to residents or 
visitors (Weisel 2002) 
Access Control and Movement Access Control and Movement reinforces 
Ownership concept while also presenting a 
physical obstacle to potential intruders; 
Gates, fences and other barriers can signal to 
potential criminals that crime is common in an area; 
Installing access control measures may be a 
financial barrier for some properties 
If pedestrian traffic is local traffic, natural surveillance 
benefits may outweigh the added potential for passers-
by to target a property and commit a crime 
Conflicting opinions among researchers 
and practitioners as whether the added 
surveillance opportunities created by 
increased pedestrian traffic outweighs the 
possible increase in crime from passers-by 
(Poyner 1983, Sorensen 2003 and Cozens 
2005) 
Property Management and 
Maintenance  
Clean properties re-enforce Ownership and 
indicate to others that a criminal behavior is 
not acceptable; Through ordinances and 
property maintenance requirements, cities 
can hold property owners accountable for 
the ongoing upkeep of property 
Areas where crime is the highest may also have 
property owners with the greatest difficulty of 
affording long term property upkeep; Depending on 
cities' current code enforcement programs, raising 
maintenance standards or increasing the frequency 
of inspection adds administration costs 
Existing code enforcement programs determine the 
cost and likely resistance to implementation by 
property owners 
Improving the cleanliness and aesthetics of 
a property can reduce crime (Ross 2000); 
"Broken Window Theory" which states 
that one broken window encourages other 
windows to be broken (essentially the 
same concept as property maintenance) is 
disputed (Thacker 2004) 
Activity Support Activity Support integrates actual resident 
use of spaces to increase surveillance, 
Ownership and access control; Effective at 
moving specific crime-prone activities 
(ATM machines, laundry area at night) to 
areas of activity where natural surveillance 
can assist 
While new buildings can be designed to encourage 
non-criminal activities (walking, fellowship) to 
occur in or near public spaces, existing property 
changes may not change longstanding social norms 
or activity patterns by residents 
Cooperation by crime prevention by design 
administrator, property management and area residents 
determines the extent to which design can affect 
activity locations and increase natural surveillance 
Mixed-use neighborhoods containing 
combinations of commercial, retail and 
residential are believed to reduce crime by 
increasing natural surveillance (Cozens 
2005)  
Target Hardening By increasing the quality of locks on doors, 
windows and other entry points, criminals 
may be deterred from breaking and 
entering; Existing structures can be 
retrofitted to improve entrance security 
Criminals may pass up a house because it has 
secure locks, but they may simply target another 
property in the area with weak locks (crime 
displacement); New locks may not be affordable to 
high crime areas; Locks are only effective if utilized 
by residents 
The financial resources residents have available to 
implement changes and the participation of home 
building material manufacturers will determine 
effectiveness 
Crime prevention by design components 
will only be effective if they consider the 
financial limitations and technical 
capacities of residents (Dershem 1990) 
Source: Author’s review of example cities or academic research. 
 and pedestrian "permeability" around a building, while others preferred that property designs 
maximize activity and increase natural surveillance.  Such differences highlight the problematic 
nature of identifying any particular strategy or component as a "best practice." 
            Table 2, Implementation Approaches and Interpretations of Program Principles, 
combines experiences in crime prevention by design from local governments with external 
reviews from academic researchers.  Determining which specific program structure to adopt or 
how to interpret a particular crime prevention by design principle is subjective (Cozens 2002).  
What a crime prevention by design police officer may have been determined to be a best practice 
in one city may be considered ineffective by a researcher evaluating a similar practice in a 
different city.  For instance, researchers have reached opposite conclusions on the effect cul-de-
sacs have on Access Control and Movement, some arguing that they limit natural surveillance 
opportunities from neighborhood traffic, others concluding that cul-de-sacs deter criminal 
activity by delineating public spaces from private ones (Poyner 1983, Sorensen 2003, Cozens 
2005).  Analysis of one city could take into account other variables that might influence crime, 
be it changes in local unemployment rates, changes in commuter or pedestrian traffic near a 
property, demographic changes in the local population, or usage of neighborhood watch 
programs.  Other evaluations of crime prevention by design could simply measure changes in 
crime rates before and after a property or neighborhood incorporated program principles.   
             Furthermore, among the variety of implementation approaches, some are limited in 
practice to only a single city, meaning that the same approach in Lexington may not produce the 
same outcome.  Table 2 is structured to summarize factors that could facilitate or hinder various 
crime prevention by design efforts of a local government.  Whether examples come from an 
academic review or a current program practitioner, they may have equal relevance to developers 
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of Lexington's Secured by Design program.  In public policy-making settings, program 
implementers may have to make decisions "even when they lack full or scientifically rigorous 
information about what works,'" (Bardach 2003).  As such, information about certain cities or 
particular situations may be somewhat valuable irrespective of whether they have been 
empirically evaluated.  Implementation approaches or program components listed in Table 2 may 
not be mutually exclusive. 
 
Lexington Political, Organizational and Logistical Context 
            Identifying barriers to implementing Secured by Design in Fayette County depends upon 
the specific approach taken by city leaders.  Some program approaches naturally align with 
planning efforts already in place by Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government's Police and 
Planning Divisions, others require investments and strategies not currently being considered.  
Table 3 lists individuals interviewed for this analysis.  Of all the LFUCG-employed individuals 
interviewed, including a Councilmember, a Senior Planner of the Division of Planning, the 
Director of the Division of Planning, a Commander of the Division of Police and a Lieutenant, 
there was agreement that voluntary compliance for home builders was the best implementation 
approach.  As might be expected, the Executive Vice President of the Home Builders 
Association of Lexington reported that area developers prefer a voluntary approach to 
incorporating Secured by Design in property development.   
 In addition to initial agreement on voluntary program compliance, all interviewees 
believed the Division of Police was currently best suited to manage the program.  As all of the 
efforts to implement a Secured by Design program in Lexington to date have been Police-
initiated, agreement that Police should initially lead the program may not indicate how it will be  
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governed indefinitely.  
Interviews conducted for this 
analysis took place during what 
should be considered a 
preliminary planning process.  If 
a Secured by Design program 
becomes established and long-
term plans to encompass all of 
Fayette County are pursued, the 
role of the Division of Planning 
will have to be defined (Eblen 
2010).  Interviews with the 
Division of Police suggested that 
police will maintain authority 
over the program, while the 
Division of Planning staff could 
not envision a comprehensive (county-wide) program that did not involve Planning having a 
major role (Emmons 2010).  As explored in detail in a subsequent section, Likely Program 
Approach for Lexington, interviewees are less certain as to how Police should specifically 
structure and operate Secured by Design.   
            All interviewees cited the influence of the current economic recession on creating a new 
program.  Like nearly any other policy initiative being developed in 2010, the reduced budget 
environment greatly defines the scope of a Secured by Design program.  Later discussions of the 
Table 3 
Secured by Design Project Interviews 
Commander Mark 
Barnard, Lexington 
Division of Police  
Com. Barnard manages the Lexington Police 
Department’s Training Section and Recruitment 
Academy.  Barnard attended Secured by Design 
training events in conjunction with the Eastern 
Kentucky University Center for Crime and the Built 
Environment.   
Lieutenant Gregg 
Jones, Lexington 
Division of Police 
Lt. Jones is the Accreditation Manager for the 
Lexington Police Department’s Bureau of Professional 
Standards.  Jones currently serves on LFUCG's Land 
Subdivision Technical Committee managed by the 
Division of Planning and has attended Secured by 
Design training events. 
Chris King, Director, 
Lexington Division 
of Planning 
King oversees the all activities of the LFUCG 
Division of Planning.  King is familiar with crime 
prevention by design and has a goal to include the 
concept in the Division’s review processes in 2010.  
Jimmy Emmons, 
Senior Planner, 
Lexington Division 
of Planning 
Emmons focuses primarily on Infill and 
Redevelopment efforts for the Division of Planning. 
 Emmons is familiar with the crime prevention by 
design and its possible application to Lexington. 
Councilmember K.C. 
Crosbie, Lexington 
City Council  
Councilmember Crosbie is seeking a third term as 7th 
District representative on the LFUCG Council. 
 Crosbie has worked with Police on crime prevention 
and design issues of neighborhoods in the 7th District.  
Todd Johnson, 
Executive Vice 
President, Home 
Builders Association 
of Lexington  
Johnson represents over 1,200 area businesses 
involved in Lexington residential construction and 
remodeling.  Johnson has attended Secured by Design 
training events and is coordinating efforts to have local 
construction materials accredited by Secured by 
Design.     
 (Barnard 2010, Crosbie 2010, Emmons 2010, Johnson 2010, Jones 2010, 
King 2010)  
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program's currently proposed structure examine the appeal of managing the program as a new 
non-profit organization verusus a new LFUCG division.  Planning staff indicated that a new 
program with minimal office space and staff would easily cost $100,000 to $250,000 to operate 
(King 2010).  Crime prevention by design programs implemented in other U.S. cities in the past 
may have enjoyed greater flexibility to hire new personnel, expand overtime budgets of 
municipal employees to implement a new program, or even to offset costs with state or federal 
assistance.  Some best practices are neither realistic during LFUCG's current revenue shortfalls, 
nor do they align with preferences expressed by home builders or staff of the Division of 
Planning and the Division of Police.  Certain approaches might achieve program goals identified 
by some individuals during interviews, but might not achieve other goals.  Table 4 lists 
conditions in Fayette County that would either facilitate or inhibit certain implementation 
approaches.  
 Some municipalities take steps to incorporate crime prevention by design through long 
term planning documents.  The City of Roanoke, Virginia in 2001 included in its Vision 2020 
plan a goal to develop opportunities to use crime prevention by design in the city's property 
review process.  Citizen groups, government divisions and political activists have produced 
several similar 'vision' statements in Fayette County (Crosbie 2010).  Some documents have 
managed to impact LFUCG policy, others remain unused.  For example, longstanding efforts to 
link Lexington's bicycle trails were aided by the inclusion of bicycle planning in the Destination 
2040 report (Office of the Mayor 2009).   
 Other goals in Destination 2040, like the completion of a monorail feasibility study for 
Fayette County, have not experienced similar momentum.  The differences in success may come 
from the length of the respective plans' existence, the scope of the projects, the availability of  
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outside funding or other factors.  As such, including plans for incorporating Secured by Design  
into future planning documents does not preclude any other implementation approach.  The only  
possible barrier such an approach presents is the risk of including Secured by Design plans in 
vision plans that never generate action, creating a perception among city leaders that the program 
does not merit further discussion in the near future.  No LFUCG division or community 
organization has announced plans to produce another long-term planning document this year, but 
Table 4 
 Matching Crime Prevention by Design Implementation Approaches to Lexington  
Practice Facilitating factors  Inhibiting factors 
Crime prevention by design 
included as a goal of long-
term city vision statements or 
comprehensive plans, usually 
as part of planning, zoning or 
public safety policy 
Other Fayette County vision statements have 
included near-term action items; November 2010 
local elections in Fayette County present an 
opportunity for Secured by Design to be included 
in administration vision plans; Long-term 
planning document approach may be conducive 
to current reduced budget environment  
Lexington currently has at least five long-term planning 
documents, most of which include zoning or public safety 
issues that will not be revisited for several years; Other 
initiatives previously included in Lexington vision plans have 
not been implemented; Priorities in council and mayoral 
administrations may not align with vision statements 
produced in conjunction with previous administrations  
Consultation with crime 
prevention by design 
administrator required for all 
new properties except single-
family homes; Compliance 
with consultation voluntary 
Current Planning Division staff and Police are 
familiar with Secured by Design principles 
possibly allowing a small number of property 
consultations to begin immediately; If Secured by 
Design consultation is required, voluntary 
compliance program may be preferred by housing 
developers 
Planning staff and police interviewed believed this approach 
would impose excessive bureaucracy; Current LFUCG 
employees trained in Secured by Design would be insufficient 
if consultation was required; As developers of single-family 
homes are currently involved with Secured by Design 
planning, an approach that includes single-family homes may 
be more feasible; As developers are currently involved with 
planning the Secured by Design program, inclusion of any 
sort of mandatory component could discourage their support 
Crime prevention by design 
standards incorporated into 
city building codes and 
ordinances for all new 
property construction or 
renovation except single-
family homes 
New building codes could be formed with current 
Planning Division and Police staff familiar with 
Secured by Design principles; Home builders 
already familiar with material testing component 
of Secured by Design; Planning staff said that to 
achieve other current safety and aesthetic 
standards, zoning ordinances coupled with 
enforcement have been necessary to influence 
property owner behavior   
Planning staff and police interviewed believed this approach 
would impose excessive bureaucracy; Planning staff reported 
that additional resources required for this approach were 
unlikely to be allocated in current budget environment; As 
developers of single-family homes are currently involved 
with Secured by Design planning, an approach that includes 
single-family homes may be more feasible; Requires training 
of Building Inspection staff and possibly new personnel 
Providing grants or incentives 
for property owners to 
incorporate crime prevention 
by design in new and existing 
properties 
Interviewed individuals said if federal grants 
became available, then a grant program for 
existing homes should be pursued; If properties 
are remodeled, then developer has an incentive to 
use Secured by Design materials to increase 
resale value 
No plans by current Planning Division staff or Police to 
include a grant component to program; Added expense of 
grant component not likely in reduced budget environment; 
No permanent funding source for existing property grants 
might make program participation and awareness sporadic 
Crime prevention by design 
principles utilized on project-
specific instance 
Interview responses indicated this is the currently 
preferred approach; Facilitates ability to operate 
Secured By Design with existing resources and 
personnel 
Does not address community-wide crime prevention that 
Planning Staff suggest might raise political support for 
Secured by Design program; Accumulation of local crime 
prevention by design expertise from ongoing program 
operations is limited given smaller number of homes being 
reviewed; May over-rely on developers to initiate projects or 
over-rely on federal funds for targeting high crime areas 
Require a "crime impact 
statement" for new property 
construction 
Aligns with Planning Division and Police's desire 
for program to eventually have community-wide 
effect on crime; Facilitates Planning and Police's 
goal for Secured by Design to be considered a 
part of "sustainable communities" initiatives in 
Lexington by requiring a crime impact statement 
in addition to currently required  environmental 
impact statement 
No support by developers for requiring a crime impact 
statement; Planning Division, Police and developers 
expressed concerns for creating additional legal liability for 
property owners; Current budget environment not conducive 
to hiring additional Planning or Police staff to review and 
approve crime impact statements 
(Barnard 2010, Crosbie 2010, Emmons 2010, Johnson 2010, Jones 2010, King 2010) 
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2010 is an election year.  For purposes of generating public discussion of a new program, 
campaign platforms by mayoral and council candidates could present an opportunity (Jones 
2010).  If a new mayoral administration or contingency of councilmembers include Secured by 
Design as one of their public priorities, the program may be more likely to be adopted in coming 
years.  Building support to initiate Secured by Design in Fayette County in conjunction with a 
particular campaign could discourage future cooperation if an excluded non-supportive candidate 
was elected.   
            The approach taken by Broward County Florida in 1996 designated the Director of 
Development Management to review all site and building designs for compliance with crime 
prevention by design standards adopted by Broward County in 1996 (Broward 2010).  The 
equivalent position in LFUCG would be the Director of Planning.  Planning staff reported that its 
current divisional capacities would not allow for an additional specific review process for crime 
prevention (King 2010, Emmons 2010).  The crime prevention by design program specifically 
being considered by Fayette County, Secured by Design, does not include a mandatory review 
process for all new property developments (Jones 2010).  However, if Lexington's Secured by 
Design is to grow and eventually cover all properties in Fayette County, the program could likely 
not remain a solely police-administered effort.  The personnel necessary for mandatory property 
evaluation would be a significant barrier to program implementation if this approach were 
pursued in Fayette County (Emmons 2010).  Similarly problematic would be the approach taken 
by the City of SeaTac, Washington in 2003, in which the city's entire building and zoning code 
was revised to include crime prevention by design principles (SeaTac 2010).  For Fayette 
County-area developers, costs would have to be incurred to ensure architects and construction 
professionals became familiar with new property standards.  Broward County and the City of 
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SeaTac excluded single-family residential homes from the review requirement.  Current 
discussions between LFUCG officials and area property developers center around an entirely 
voluntary program, with new, single-family homes being the primary focus (Johnson 2010).   
            The goal expressed by those interviewed in the Division of Police and the Division of 
Planning to have widespread participation from home or property owners in high-crime 
neighborhoods is at odds with the current absence of an identified funding source for a 
homeowner grant program.  Added building costs to reach Secured by Design certification were 
estimated by one Lexington police officer to be $650 (Jones 2010). Armitage's 2000 study of 
Secured by Design estimated developer costs for including certified building materials to be 
between $150 and $1,500 (Armitage 2000).  Incorporating Secured by Design-certified materials 
may be less expensive during the initial construction phase as opposed to property renovation 
(Jones 2010, Johnson 2010).   
 What level of costs will be a barrier for homeowners will vary, but in low-income, high-
crime neighborhoods where renovations may be more frequent than new housing construction, 
costs may discourage program participation.  A 2007 study of crime prevention by design 
program compliance found that the availability of financial resources dictated the extent to which 
property owners incorporated program principles into existing buildings (Parnaby 2007).  If 
Secured by Design is intended to reduce opportunities for home invasion, assault, loitering and 
other illegal activities, it cannot ignore the areas where crime is most prevalent.  By not 
identifying financial assistance for property owners in low-income area, Secured by Design may 
be ignoring its most relevant constituents.  Not focusing on Lexington neighborhoods with the 
greatest perceived need of crime prevention could reduce political support by Lexington leaders 
and create a significant barrier to growing or implementing Secured by Design.   
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            Preliminary interaction with the Home Builders Association of Lexington indicates that 
new residential homes may be the most regular beneficiary of Secured by Design, but new 
residential subdivisions may not experience the same problems as older neighborhoods in other 
parts of Lexington (Johnson 2010).  Of course, it is impossible to predict whether Secured by 
Design program administrators might engage in partnerships with low-cost housing programs 
like Habitat for Humanity or seek sponsorships with developers or building supply companies to 
retrofit properties in low-income neighborhoods.  Lexington Police, in fact, led a 2009 initiative 
to help residents, owners and apartment complex managers limit their exposure to criminal 
behavior.  The "Lexington Crime Free Multi-Housing Program" included a ten hour seminar by 
police, civil attorneys and other city officials, and allowed building owners to have their property 
inspected and certified as adhering to crime prevention by design (Division of Police 2009).  No 
grants were made available to provide new locks, windows or any other property improvements, 
but if similar educational initiatives are a part of Secured by Design in the future, the lack of 
grant money for existing property owners might not be as great of a concern to city leaders.   
            If Lexington takes a voluntary program compliance approach, increasing the number of 
developers and property owners who incorporate Secured by Design could be difficult.  The 
program aspect cited by those interviewed as being most likely to attract participants was the 
opportunity for reduced insurance rates (Barnard 2010, Jones 2010).  "Reducing insurance bills 
is the main part of the economic risk-management strategy of Secured by Design.  By utilizing 
the program, developers and homeowners are reducing their risk of crime as much as a home 
alarm system," suggested one Lexington police officer.  Area insurance companies do currently 
offer discounts for using deadbolt locks and alarm systems, but tying discounts to a specific 
program like Secured by Design could be problematic (Kentucky Farm Bureau 2010).  U.S. 
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insurance companies will be operating in a different governmental environment than exists in the 
United Kingdom.  Particularly, the U.K. national government's backing of Secured by Design's 
product certification will not be the same in the United States, at least initially.  As there are 
currently no Secured by Design programs in the U.S., there is no federal government agency that 
specifically endorses Secured by Design as being an effective reducer of crime.  Staff from the 
Division of Planning believe that until Secured by Design became a nationally-adopted program, 
similar to the federal government's Fire Rating System and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency's Community Rating System for flood insurance relief, insurance reductions would be 
difficult to negotiate (Emmons 2010).     
            Peter Olasky considered how property developers might be influenced to incorporate 
crime prevention by design if governments required "crime impact statements," (equivalent to 
environmental impact statements) for new development proposals (Olasky 2004).  
Environmental impacts statements, he argued, have allowed local governments to increase 
awareness of environmental issues by developers.  Apart from trying to comply with minimum 
local standards, impact statements make developers mindful of future risk of environmental 
litigation.  LFUCG currently requires developers to identify potential environmental issues in 
planning proposals, but extending this requirement to include possible criminal behavior impact 
could be a significant expansion in the responsibilities of the Division of Police or the Division 
of Planning (Emmons 2010, Jones 2010).   
 But as a new program containing somewhat subjective principles, Secured by Design 
administrators could benefit from accumulating data and having a record of how developers 
interpret and incorporate crime prevention principles.  Requiring a crime impact statement would 
facilitate Secured by Design proponents' goal of expanding the program to all of Fayette County, 
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but it conflicts with Police’s desire to not impose "additional bureaucracy" on developers (Eblen 
2010, Jones 2010).  Currently, a Lexington police officer is included on LFUCG's Land 
Subdivision Technical Committee, allowing crime prevention by design principles to be 
conveyed during development planning.  The 34-person Land Subdivision Technical Committee 
consists of LFUCG staff from the Division of Water and Air Quality, Planning, Engineering, 
Building Inspection, Traffic Engineering and representatives from utility companies, among 
others.  Environmental impact statements are currently a part of the Committee's review process.  
Planning staff indicated that this committee would be the ideal place to consider crime 
prevention by design if an impact statement or similar documentation was a component of 
Lexington's Secured by Design program, but said manpower does not currently exist to examine 
crime impacts for all of the properties reviewed by the committee (Emmons 2010, King 2010).     
             
Likely Program Approach for Lexington 
            Given that no U.S. municipality has implemented a Secured by Design program, the 
approach described in Tables 2 and 4 as "Crime prevention by design principles utilized on a 
project-specific instance" may best mirror the currently favored approach in Lexington.  The 
cited example, though, Louisville Metro Government's hiring of a crime prevention by design 
adviser funded by a 2005 grant from a national philanthropy foundation to assess an urban 
neighborhood, is not entirely equivalent to the current plans by Lexington officials (ACTIVE 
2010).  Louisville used one-time funds to incorporate crime prevention by design into an overall 
redevelopment plan for a particular area.  Police and Planning staff indicated that Lexington's 
Secured by Design program will likely focus on new home development, particularly testing and 
licensing of materials used in home construction.   
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 Additionally, as found in every other U.S. local government's crime prevention by design 
program, Lexington officials cited parks, trails, bus stops, schools and other public spaces as 
being a focus of Lexington's Secured by Design program (Jones 2010).  Incorporating a 
government-sponsored crime prevention program into properties like parks and schools that are 
taxpayer-financed, naturally is less controversial than imposing standards on private 
development.  Work on such public projects will likely not pose any special barriers to Secured 
by Design's implementation.  It is already LFUCG policy to include Police and Planning staff in 
such projects (King 2010).  It is not clear from interviewees what role Secured by Design would 
play in government-owned property development if the program was privately administered (e.g. 
through a privately managed non-profit organization).  
            LFUCG Planning and Police appear to agree on a general approach to implement a 
Secured by Design program; they believe a voluntary program that does not require funding from 
LFUCG will give Secured by Design the best opportunity to be embraced by developers and to 
"get off the ground," (Barnard 2010, Johnson 2010).  There is even agreement among home 
builders, elected officials, and staff from the Divisions of Police and Planning that Secured by 
Design should be a police-managed program, at least initially (Crosbie 2010, Johnson 2010, 
King 2010, Jones 2010).  A police-managed program though, may currently be interpreted in 
distinct ways (Barnard 2010, Jones 2010, Emmons 2010).  One option is for the Division of 
Police to operate Secured by Design as part of normal, crime prevention duties.  Police would 
use their current budgets for training and personnel expenses, and their authority to administer 
Secured by Design would come from a resolution passed by the Lexington-Fayette Urban 
County Council.  Planning, Building Inspection, Engineering and other LFUCG divisional staff 
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would be primarily involved in the production of a Secured by Design "design guide" that would 
interpret crime prevention by design principles and adapt them to Lexington (Jones 2010).   
 A second interpretation of "police-managed" program was offered (Barnard 2010).  
Lexington Police, with assistance from the Eastern Kentucky University Center for Crime and 
the Built Environment would create a local non-profit organization to manage Secured by 
Design.  LFUCG officials, including representatives from the Division of Planning and the 
Division of Police, would serve on the board, but the program would operate independent of any 
specific government division (Barnard 2010).  Similar to the first interpretation of a police-
managed program, the non-profit Secured by Design organization might seek a formal resolution 
passed by the Urban County Council to designate the organization as the primary authority on 
crime prevention by design efforts in Fayette County.  Such a resolution could also define the 
organization as a "Partner Agency," possibly allowing the Urban County Council authority to 
review program operations and financial records.   
            As a non-profit organization, one police officer explained, Secured by Design might have 
more legitimacy in the community than if it were controlled by any one government division 
(Barnard 2010).  Such an arrangement, though, may not automatically lend credibility.  
Lexington leaders will have to consider the unique nature of the funding sources likely to support 
Secured by Design's operations.  Secured by Design designates doors, locks, windows and other 
materials as being built to "Police Preferred Specifications," and in turn receives a fee for use of 
the Secured by Design logo (ACPO 2010).  Lexington Police were not certain as to how revenue 
from licensing fees would be shared between Lexington and the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (the U.K. organization that owns and manages Secured by Design's trademark).  
Depending on how management of program revenues is structured for Lexington's program, 
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challenges could arise in defining transparency requirements of the managing board or LFUCG's 
authority to oversee operations.  If Secured by Design is to any degree endorsed by or partnered 
with LFUCG, city leaders might feel a responsibility to investigate the program if some 
perception or allegation of mismanagement ever emerged.  Recent misconduct at LFUCG 
partner agencies like the Bluegrass Airport and Lexington Public Library have brought a 
renewed focus on oversight and accountability among city leaders (Crosbie 2010, Blackford 
2009).  The possible semi-public, semi-private nature of a non-profit structure, could be a barrier 
to program implementation.   
 
Conclusions, Limitations 
            Beyond problems specific to particular implementation approaches, the subjectivity of 
some of Secured by Design's six core principles pose a challenge for Lexington's program.  The 
Property Management and Maintenance principle implies that program administrators must 
somehow monitor properties designated as Secured by Design over time.  Such an interpretation 
suggests that Secured by Design designated properties would have a perpetual obligation to 
maintain upkeep, and accordingly, program administrators would have to maintain inspection of 
properties indefinitely (Beckford 2008).  If Secured by Design was implemented similar to 
SeaTac, Washington,  where city building codes were revised to reflect crime prevention by 
design principles, enforcing Property Management and Maintenance could likely be 
accomplished through existing Code Enforcement efforts.  But interviewees indicated a complete 
revision of building codes would be too great of a of a strain on human and financial resources 
for LFUCG.  If building codes were revised or if the LFUCG Division of Code Enforcement was 
needed for enforcement in some capacity, Secured by Design could not be managed by a non-
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profit organization; if government employees are being used to carryout a program, it would 
require a unique arrangement for that program to not be controlled by the government.  
            Interviews with LFUCG staff and property developers indicated that Lexington's Secured 
by Design program will focus on preventing crime at the planning stage of development, 
primarily by advocating the usage of building materials built to Police Preferred Specifications.  
As more empirical evidence exists for the effectiveness of specific crime prevention tactics like 
Target Hardening than exists evidence for Secured by Design, an initial program focus in 
Lexington on building materials may be advantageous (Dershem 1990, O'Shea 2000, Cozens 
2005).  More simply, whether homes in Lexington have new locks installed as part of a Secured 
by Design program, as part of another crime prevention by design program, or entirely absent of 
any program, the property is less likely to be targeted by criminals.  Given the current testing of 
building materials in conjunction with the Lexington Home Builders Association, it appears that 
the logistics of Secured by Design's primary focus are being actively thought-out and evaluated.  
How to achieve Target Hardening through use of Secured by Design-approved building materials 
will likely not be a barrier to implementation.  But the manner in which other Secured by Design 
principles (e.g. Property Management and Maintenance, Access Control and Movement) will be 
incorporated into a working program has not been fully considered.  As discussed earlier, 
researchers of city planning and criminology continue to debate the usage of cul-de-sacs versus 
grid layouts in neighborhood planning, some arguing that passing traffic discourages crime, 
others contending it facilitates crime (Cozens 2005).  Lexington program implementers will have 
to reconcile conflicting interpretations of crime prevention by design's subjective principles. 
 Trips to the United Kingdom to see Secured by Design in action helped build support in 
the Lexington Division of Police to start a program locally (Eblen 2010).  The critical role of 
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U.K.'s national government in supporting Secured by Design may have been under-appreciated.  
Interviews did not clearly explain how the lack of  national requirements for crime prevention 
liaison officers and other crime-related urban planning legislation could affect a program in 
Lexington.  One officer stated that adapting to the U.S. environment where Secured by Design 
was not explicitly supported by state or federal governments would be "part of the creative 
process."  Perhaps it can be expected that a complete understanding of how Secured by Design 
should be adapted is still being developed.  Still, the environment in which Secured by Design 
will operate in will not be the same as the environment across the pond.  National legislation like 
the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act of 2004, or 
government-issued policy memos like the Urban Policy White Paper in 2000, helped develop a 
broad, strategic approach to bringing police and planning authorities together to design out crime 
(Morton 2005).  Even in the United States, enabling legislation from state governments helped 
develop widespread local crime prevention by design programs across Florida and Virginia 
(Roanoke 2010, Broward 2010).   
 Apart from the building material testing and certification program, Lexington's program 
would have to be structured differently from the U.K.'s.  Being the first U.S. municipality to use 
Secured by Design is likely to impede the transferability of program effects in the U.K., and may 
inhibit the program from eventually having an impact on all of Fayette County.  If the federal 
government or Kentucky state government was familiar with and supportive of Secured by 
Design to the degree that the U.K. government is, duplicating the program's success in Lexington 
might be easier.  If the program was not perceived to be a success, Lexington Police would 
probably not be trying to implement it.  That perceived success, though, is based on a program in 
the U.K..  The political and governmental environment in which Secured by Design currently 
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operates in facilitates program awareness and usage in the U.K..  To what degree conditions 
specific to the U.K. determine program success is uncertain.  But, if Secured by Design in 
Lexington is to develop from a voluntary program into a fundamental component of the city's 
planning and construction process, a lack of state and national government funding or supportive 
legislation may be an issue.  It is not certain that such support might not emerge in the future, 
either from government or private organizations.  Nonetheless, Lexington program implementers 
should consider how state or federal officials might facilitate the success of Secured by Design. 
 Secured by Design advocates estimated that the program would not be ready to start in 
Lexington until the end of 2011.  To what extent can interviews performed in March 2010 be 
used to identify barriers to effective program implementation a year from now or longer?  No 
one interviewed for this research claimed that plans for the program were finalized.  How staff 
members from the Division of Planning and the Division of Police envision the program today 
may change before implementation.  Meetings with home builders, city leaders, academic 
researchers, planning professionals and police identified several issues that will undoubtedly 
have to be resolved.  Some of the best practices identified by researchers or crime prevention by 
design program administrators offer guidance to resolve implementation barriers, others may not 
be applicable to the particular approach taken for Lexington's program.  To effectively 
implement Secured by Design, program administrators may need to:    
1. Pursue strategies to increase program awareness and support at the state and federal 
level.  Recognition by higher governments of Secured by Design's possible effectiveness 
as a crime prevention tool could ease program growth either by providing funding 
directly or increasing awareness of the program in Lexington.  
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2. Examine the implications of managing the program through a government division or 
non-profit board administering the program.  A non-profit program may not be as 
dependent on LFUCG funding, but a government program may be better suited for 
incorporating Secured by Design principles into county-wide planning and development. 
3. Identify how usage of the Secured by Design trademark and funding from the 
certification of building materials will be arranged with the Association of Chief Police 
Officers.  Partnering with the privately-owned program in the U.K. may in many ways 
facilitate program operations, but the arrangement could also limit the flexibility of 
Lexington to adapt the program's structure and policies.  
4. Develop strategies to serve existing low-income area properties with high-crime.  What 
the current focus of the program appears to be - approving building materials and designs 
for new residential homes - may not be addressing the most pressing crime prevention 
needs of the community.  Secured by Design efforts may be more effective if done in 
conjunction with existing community policing efforts like neighborhood-assigned 
officers, the Lexington Crime Free Multi-Housing Program and neighborhood watch 
programs. 
5. Structure the program to be adaptable to unique property situations, while clearly 
delineating methods to incorporate program principles.  If program usage in Lexington 
grows, a program manual may be necessary to provide detailed guidance for developers 
or homeowners.   Absent clear program interpretation, widespread usage throughout the 
community may be difficult. 
6. Incorporate Secured by Design standards into building codes and planning ordinances if 
the program is to expand and include larger numbers of properties.  Such an undertaking 
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may require LFUCG employee resources that are not currently available.  Though current 
plans do not call for any change to LFUCG rules, the long-term growth of the program 
will be difficult without incorporating Secured by Design principles to some extent.  
7. Negotiate with insurance providers how rate discounts could be offered for properties 
certified by Secured by Design.  Area insurance agencies already provide similar 
discounts for use of certain home security measures, but tying discounts to a specific 
program new to the United States may be a challenge.  Program implementers might seek 
out alternative incentives to encourage usage of the program, especially if insurance 
discounts are not available.  
8. Define how Secured by Design should interact with LFUCG's Land Subdivision 
Technical Committee and other city planning processes.  The role of police officers in the 
planning process may be more effective if it is formalized either by action of the Urban 
County Council or changes to internal policies and procedures.  Ensuring that LFUCG 
reviews of building architecture or development plans consider crime prevention 
practices may only be possible if the responsibilities and authorities of the Division of 
Police are communicated to the Division of Planning.  
9. Define what formal role staff from the Division of Planning should play in Secured by 
Design.  If the program is established as a police-led non-profit organization, how will 
the expertise of city planners be utilized to ensure program principles are incorporated 
into neighborhood design projects across Fayette County?  Crime prevention by design 
efforts will be most effective if they combine the expertise of police and urban planners.  
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